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VVhat will the result be the next time the U.S. Supreme Court faces 
physician-assisted suicide? 
The future 
of physician-assisted 
suicide 
I believe that when the Supreme Court 
handed down its decisions in 1997 in 
Washington v. Glucksberg1 and Vacca v. 
Quill,Z proponents of physician-assisted 
suicide (PAS) suffered a much greater set-
back than many of them are able or willing 
to admit. 
When, in 1996 within one month, the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and 
Second Circuits became the first two U.S. 
appellate courts to hold that there was a 
right to assisted suicide under any cir-
cumstances,3 they generated a good deal of 
momentum in favor of PAS. The fact that 
there was no dissent in the Second Circuit 
case and the Ninth Circuit decision was 
supported by a large majority (8-3) con-
tributed to this momentum. So did the di-
rectness and forcefulness of the majority 
Yale Kamisar is the Clarence Darrow 
Distinguished University Professor of 
Law, University of Michigan. This article 
is adapted from a longer article to be 
published in the Minnesota Law Review. 
(Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact 
of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).) 
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opinions-which contained strong lan-
guage that could be used effectively to ad-
vance the PAS cause in op-ed pieces, talk 
shows, state legislatures, and state courts. 
Then, the U.S. Supreme Court entered 
the fray. It disagreed with the lower federal 
courts virtually point by point and in effect 
eradicated all the lower courts' forceful and 
felicitous language.4 
Nor is that all. The constitutional argu-
ments that proponents of PAS made with-
out success in the Supreme Court and the 
policy arguments they have been making, 
and will continue to make, in the state leg-
islatures or state courts or on the op-ed 
pages greatly overlap. There are only so 
many arguments in favor of a "right" to 
PAS, and almost all were addressed by the 
Court in the Glucksberg and Quill cases. 
The Court, for example, considered the fol-
lowing arguments: 
1. Withdrawal of life support is nothing 
more or less than assisted suicide; there is 
no significant moral or legal distinction be-
tween the two. 
2. There is no meaningful difference be-
tween administering palliative drugs with 
the knowledge that they are likely to has-
ten the patient's death and prescribing a 
lethal dose of drugs for the very purpose of 
killing a patient.5 
3. The 1990 Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health case6 was not 
simply about the right to forgo unwanted 
medical treatment; it was really about per-
sonal autonomy and the right to control 
the time and manner of one's death. 
4. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
protects one's right to make intimate and 
personal choices, such as those relating to 
marriage, procreation, child rearing-and 
the time and manner of one's death. As the 
Ninth Circuit observed, quoting from 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey: "Like the de-
cision [whether] to have an abortion, the 
decision how and when to die is one of 'the 
most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'cen-
tral to personal dignity and autonomy."'7 
A majority of the Court, I think it's fair 
to say, did not find any of the arguments 
summarized above convincing.8 Thus, 
these arguments have lost a considerable 
amount of credibility and will be easier to 
rebuff when made again, albeit in a differ-
ent setting. 
I am well aware that in both Glucksberg 
and Quill Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
provided the fifth vote to make Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist's opinions the opin-
ions of the Court-by stating that she 
joined Rehnquist's opinion, yet writing 
separately. I am aware, too, that in large 
measure, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
and Stephen Breyer joined O'Connor's 
opinion. 
However, there is no clear indication in 
O'Connor's brief concurring opinion that 
she found any of the principal arguments 
made by PAS proponents any more per-
suasive than Rehnquist did. There is no 
suggestion, for example, that she reads 
the Cruzan opinion any more broadly 
than Rehnquist does or that she interprets 
the stirring language in Casey any more 
expansively. 
Nor is there any suggestion that she has 
any more difficulty accepting the distinc-
tion between forgoing life-sustaining med-
ical treatment and actively intervening to 
bring about death. Nor is there any reason 
to think that she has more trouble grasp-
ing the "double effect" principle (the prin-
ciple that explains why a doctor forbidden 
to administer a lethal dose of drugs for the 
very purpose of killing a patient may in-
crease the dosage of medication needed to 
relieve pain even though the increased 
dosage is likely to hasten death or increase 
its risk). 
Indeed, in one respect at least, O'Connor 
may have gone a step further than Rehn-
quist. She may be saying-she is certainly 
implying-that the "double effect" princi-
ple is not only plausible but necessary. 
Her position (and Breyer's) seems to be 
that if, for example, a state were to prohib-
it the pain relief that a patient desperately 
needs when the increased dosage of med-
ication is so likely to hasten death or cause 
unconsciousness that, according to the 
state, the procedure smacks of assisted sui-
cide or euthanasia, she (presumably along 
with Breyer and Ginsburg) would want to 
revisit the question. 
I realize that the Supreme Court's fail-
TONY STONE WORLDWIDE 
The legal issues surrounding physician-
assisted suicide are still very much alive. 
ure to recognize a constitutional right to 
PAS, even under the most restricted con-
ditions, does not prevent one from arguing 
that there is a common law right, a state 
constitutional right, or a "moral" or "polit-
ical" right, to PAS. But it will be a good deal 
harder to engage in any kind of "rights 
talk" after the Supreme Court decisions 
than before. 
I liked the result in the 1997 cases. Nev-
ertheless, I have to agree with those com-
mentators-many of whom were quite un-
happy with the result-who believe that 
the Court will revisit the issue in the next 
5 or 10 years. Unlike a goodly number of 
other Court watchers, however, I very 
much doubt that the next time the Court 
confronts the issue the result will be any 
different. There were a number of factors 
at work when the Court decided the 1997 
PAS cases, and most of them will still be 
49 
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The strong opposition of the American Medical Association 
is bound to influence some justices in future cases. 
operating when the Court addresses the 
issue a second time. 
For one thing, assisted suicide and other 
issues related to death and dying have been 
the subject of vigorous debate in recent 
years, and there is little reason to think this 
agitation will subside in the foreseeable fu-
ture. For another thing, the rights of a po-
litically vulnerable group are not at stake-
as had been the situation when the Court 
intervened in prior instances.9 
O'Connor put it well, I think, when, re-
iterating a point she had made during the 
oral arguments, 10 she observed: 
Every one of us at some point may be affected 
by our own or a family member's terminal ill-
ness. There is no reason to think the democ-
ratic process will not strike the proper balance 
between the interests of terminally ill, men-
tally competent individuals who would seek to 
end their suffering and the state's interests in 
protecting those who might seek to end life 
mistakenly or under pressure. 11 
Another likely reason for the Court's re-
luctance to establish a constitutionally pro-
tected right to, or liberty interest in, as-
sisted suicide, and one that will apply the 
next time around as well as it did the first 
time, is capsuled in the solicitor general's 
amicus brief: Once an exception to the 
general prohibition against PAS is man-
dated by the Court, however heavily cir-
cumscribed it might be at first, "there is no 
obvious stopping point."12 
Thus, Rehnquist noted Washington 
state's insistence that the impact of the 
Ninth Circuit's decision-invalidating the 
state's assisted-suicide ban "only 'as applied 
to competent, terminally ill adults who 
wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining 
medication prescribed by their doctors"'-
''will not and cannot be so limited."13 Then, 
he observed: 
50 
The [Ninth Circuit's] decision, and its expan-
sive reasoning, provide ample support for the 
State's concerns. The court noted, for exam-
ple, that the "decision of a duly appointed sur-
rogate decision maker is for all legal purposes 
the decision of the patient himself"; that "in 
some instances, the patient may be unable to 
self-administer the drugs and ... administra-
tion by the physician ... may be the only way 
the patient may be able to receive them"; and 
that not only physicians, but also family mem-
bers and loved ones, will inevitably participate 
in assisting suicide. Thus, it turns out that 
what is couched as a limited right to "physi-
cian-assisted suicide" is likely, in effect, a much 
broader license, which could prove extremely 
difficult to police and contain." 
Although concurring, Justice Ginsburg 
neither joined Rehnquist's opinion nor 
wrote an opinion of her own;15 during the 
oral arguments she voiced skepticism that 
any right to PAS, no matter how narrowly 
limited initially, could or would be con-
fined to the terminally ill or could or would 
stop short of active voluntary euthanasia. 
When Kathryn Tucker, lead attorney for 
the plaintiffs in Glucksberg, urged the 
Court to recognize, or to establish, a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest "that 
involves bodily integrity, decisional auton-
omy, and the right to be free of unwanted 
pain and suffering,"16 Ginsburg retorted 
that "a lot of people would fit [this] catego-
ry," not just the terminally illY How, she 
wondered, do you "leave out the rest of the 
world who would fit the same standards"?18 
At another point, Ginsburg suggested 
that the patient who is so helpless or in so 
much agony that she "is not able to assist 
in her own suicide," but must have a health 
professional administer a lethal injection, 
is "in a more sympathetic situation" than 
one who is able to commit suicide with the 
preliminary assistance of a physician.19 
Position of medical groups 
Still another factor must have had some 
impact on at least some members of the 
Court and is bound to influence at least 
some of the justices in future cases. That 
factor is the strong opposition of the Amer-
ican Medical Association (AMA) and other 
medical groups to the constitutionalization 
or legalization of PAS (regardless of how 
narrowly limited the constitutional right 
or the statutory authorization might be). 
As New York Times reporter Linda Green-
house has pointed out,20 the amicus brief 
filed by the AMA in Glucksberg and Quill 
sharply contrasted with the one filed seven 
years earlier in Cruzan. 
In Cruzan, the AMA told the Court that, 
under the circumstances, terminating life 
support was in keeping with respect for 
"the patient's autonomy and dignity."21 In 
Glucksberg and Quill, however, the AMA 
(and more than 40 other national and state 
health care organizations) told the Court 
• "the ethical prohibition against phy-
sician-assisted suicide is a cornerstone of 
medical ethics"; 
• the AMA had repeatedly "reexamined 
and reaffirmed" that ethical prohibition 
and had done so as recently as summer 
1996;and 
• "physician-assisted suicide remains 
'fundamentally incompatible with the 
physician's role as healer, would be difficult 
or impossible to control, and would pose 
serious societal risks."'22 
Recent and continuing trends in med-
ical practice may only heighten the AMA's 
resistance to PAS. The next time the issue 
is presented, the AMA and other medical 
groups might well argue that new trends 
and developments make the need to main-
tain the absolute prohibition against PAS 
more important than ever. It would not be 
surprising if the next time around the AMA 
were to underscore the point recently 
made by two commentators: 
Given the great pressures threatening medical 
ethics today-including, among other factors, 
a more impersonal practice of medicine, the 
absence of a lifelong relationship with a physi-
cian, the push toward managed care, and the 
financially based limitation of services-a 
bright line rule regarding medically-assisted 
death is a bulwark against disaster." 
Legislative conundrum 
Another factor at work in the assisted 
suicide cases, and one that will operate as 
well the next time the Court confronts the 
issue, is the justices' realization that if they 
were to establish a right to assisted suicide, 
however limited, the need to enact legisla-
tion implementing and regulating any 
such right would generate many problems. 
These inevitably would find their way back 
to the Court. 
Whether a regulatory mechanism would 
be seen as providing patients and physi-
cians with much-needed protection or 
viewed as unduly burdening, the underly-
ing right to assisted suicide would be large-
ly in the eye of the beholder. Thus, it is not 
surprising that proponents of PAS even dis-
agree among themselves as to how a par-
ticular procedural requirement should be 
regarded. 
For example, three of the nation's most 
respected proponents of PAS, Franklin 
Miller, Howard Brody, and Timothy Quill, 
have questioned the desirability of the 15-
day waiting period required by the Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act. This provision was 
designed to ensure that a patient's decision 
to elect assisted suicide is resolute.24 Ac-
cording to Miller, Brody, and Quill, this "ar-
bitrary time period ... may be highly bur-
densome for patients who are suffering 
intolerably and may preclude access to as-
sisted death for those who request it at the 
point when they are imminently dying."25 
The same three commentators have also 
criticized a provision of a Model State Act 
requiring that the discussion between 
physician and patient concerning a request 
for assisted suicide be witnessed by two 
adults.26 They called it "unduly intrusive 
and unlikely to be effective."27 
On the other hand, they maintain that 
an Oregon provision requiring a second 
medical opinion on the decision is "not a 
reliable safeguard" because it "does not 
mandate that the consulting physician be 
genuinely independent."28 
Perhaps the most rigorous condition on 
PAS to be found is the requirement of 
Compassion in Dying that the approval of 
all the would-be-suicide's immediate fam-
ily members be obtained.29 (This organiza-
tion provides professionals to help termi-
nally ill people commit suicide. It was also 
one of the plaintiffs in Glucksberg.) 
It is hard to believe that any group fa-
voring PAS would retain this requirement 
if the Court were to establish a constitu-
tional right to assisted suicide. But one can 
be fairly sure that if the Court were to es-
TRIAL • July 1998 
tablish this right, PAS opponents would 
fight hard to include a "family approval" 
provision in any legislation regulating as-
sisted suicide. 
They would also want mandatory wait-
ing periods, specified information and 
procedures to ensure that the decision to 
choose PAS is "truly informed," and all 
sorts of notification requirements and bans 
on the use of public facilities, public em-
ployees, and public funds.30 
Although not insubstantial, the differ-
ences among proponents of PAS over the 
requisite conditions and procedures for 
carrying out the practice pale compared to 
the differences likely to exist between PAS 
proponents and those opposed to legaliz-
ing any PAS at all. In short, in many re-
spects the legislative response to a 
Supreme Court decision establishing a 
Few physicians assist patient suicides 
A national survey found that although 
a substantial proportion of physicians 
have received requests from patients for 
lethal injections or prescriptions to has-
ten death, few have complied with their 
patients' wishes. 
In 1996, researchers from Mount 
Sinai School of Medicine, New York; the 
University of Chicago; and the Univer-
sity of Rochester, New York, sent ques-
tionnaires to 3,102 physicians practic-
ing in 10 specialties in which doctors 
are most likely to receive requests for 
assisted suicide. Sixty-one percent of 
those surveyed responded. The results 
were published in the April23, 1998, 
issue of The New England Journal of 
Medicine. 
Eleven percent of physicians said that 
under current legal constraints there 
were circumstances in which they 
would prescribe a fatal dose of medica-
tion to hasten a patient's death. Seven 
percent said they would provide a lethal 
injection. 
Eighteen percent of the physicians 
said they have received requests from a 
patient to hasten death. Sixteen percent 
of the physicians receiving such re-
quests, or 3 percent of the entire sam-
ple, have prescribed a fatal dose of med-
ication. Five percent of the entire 
sample have given at least one lethal in-
.. jection. All tol<i, 6 percent have admin-
. )stE!re,~.al~~h~l~Il)ject.ion or written a 
'<·l~®4~~~~i~p~n at least once. ·;:;,·:,;:::·I1~~~~~~~~·~~~ •. ~t~ce•before ()regon 
· ... '\$~~~~(9~~~ tneJJ~ath with Dignity 
':. Act: in !Nov~m~~.:r 111~.7, Vot~rs had 
passed the act in 1994, but the state leg-
islature asked for a repeal last year. In-
stead, 60 percent of voters reaffirmed 
the act. 
Under the act, doctors may prescribe 
deadly doses of barbiturates and other 
drugs to adults of sound mind who have 
been given less than six months to live. 
The act applies only to Oregon resi-
dents. According to an article in The 
Washington Post onApril29, 1998, the 
act requires oral and written requests, 
consulting opinions by other physi-
cians, a 15-day waiting period, and no-
tification of pharmacists and state 
health authorities. 
After the request is approved, the 
physician prescribes a fatal drug the pa-
tient may take at his or her discretion 
with or without a doctor present. Physi-
cians may not give lethal injections. 
Opponents fear the act will lead to a 
rash of suicides by patients with treat-
able diseases. However, in the six-
month period since the act took effect, 
Compassion in Dying Federation, ana-
tional advocacy group headquartered in 
Oregon that counsels the terminally ill 
on assisted suicide, confirmed only 15 
requests by patients seeking assisted 
suicide. Of those, seven patients' re-
quests are being processed, four pa-
tients have died of natural causes, three 
patients were found ineligible for assis-
tance, and one patient died after taking 
a lethal dose of barbiturates. Only one 
other case of physician-assisted suicide 
has been reported. 
-Jennifer L. Reicherl 
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right to assisted suicide is likely to be are-
play of the response to Roe v. Wade, 31 a 
specter that did not escape the attention of 
the justices last year. 
At one point in the oral arguments, 
Rehnquist told the lead lawyer for the 
Glucksberg plaintiffs: 
You're not asking that [this Court engage in 
legislation] now. But surely that's what the 
next couple of generations are going to have 
to deal with, what regulations are admissible 
and what not if we uphold your position here. 
. . . [Y]ou're going to find the same thing ... 
that perhaps has happened with the abortion 
cases, there are people who are just totally op-
posed and people who are totally in favor of 
them. So you're going to have those factions 
fighting it out in every session of the legisla· 
ture-how far can we go in regulating this. 
And that will be a constitutional decision in 
every case. 32 
Roe v. Wade ignited what has aptly been 
called a "domestic war,"33 one that, after a 
quarter-century of tumult, seems finally to 
have come to an end in the courts. The 
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Court that decided the assisted suicide 
cases in 1997 was not eager to set off a new 
domestic war. I venture to say that the 
Court will not be eager to do so the next 
time around either. D 
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